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Abstract 
We consider a two-period airline yield management problem where customers may act strategically. 
Specifically, we allow for the possibility that a customer may decide to defer purchase in the hope that a 
ticket cheaper than those currently on offer will become available. We also allow for the possibility that 
some customers will buy a more expensive ticket if the cheaper tickets are not available. We show how to 
find optimal booking limits in the presence of such strategic customer behavior. We also explicitly 
incorporate the fact that, once a booking limit has been reached, demand distributions are now censored 
distributions. 
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Optimal Booking Limits in the Presence of Strategic Consumer 
Behavior 
John G. Wilson, Chris K. Anderson and Sang-Won Kim 
University of Western Ontario 
We consider a two-period airline yield management problem where customers may act 
strategically. Speciﬁcally, we allow for the possibility that a customer may decide to defer 
purchase in the hope that a ticket cheaper than those currently on oﬀer will become available. 
We also allow for the possibility that some customers will buy a more expensive ticket if the 
cheaper tickets are not available. We show how to ﬁnd optimal booking limits in the presence of 
such strategic customer behavior. We also explicitly incorporate the fact that, once a booking 
limit has been reached, demand distributions are now censored distributions. 
Introduction 
During any given period, an airline has an inventory of seats available for sale in diﬀerent fare 
classes. Using purchase patterns and projections of future sales in the various fare classes, an airline will 
typically move inventory between classes in order to maximize expected revenue. Littlewood (1972) 
considered a one-period model with two fare classes. Belobaba (1989) developed the expected marginal 
seat revenue (EMSR) approach which extended Littlewood’s one-period model to the case of multiple 
fares. Pfeifer (1989), Bodily and Weatherford (1995), Belobaba and Weatherford (1996) and 
Weatherford et al. (1993) analyze single-period models where a customer may buy a more expensive 
ticket if cheaper ones are not available. Sen and Zhang (1999) analyze a single-period model with two 
fare classes where it is assumed that a certain fraction of customers will purchase the more expensive 
item if cheaper ones are not available. For this case, they provide a procedure for ﬁnding the booking 
limit (the limit on the number of items that can be sold at a cheaper price) that maximizes the 
company’s expected revenue. 
An airline, of course, has many opportunities for the reallocation of seats to fare classes. Single- 
period models are certainly valuable and provide insight. However, ideally, models that take advantage 
of the fact that allocations can be made during diﬀerent periods are desirable. Belobaba’s EMSR model 
can be repeatedly applied to allow for multiple periods. The early approaches to deal with the ﬂexibility 
in resetting booking limits simply reapplied the static one- period models, in what has been termed 
advanced static approaches (Weatherford and Bodily, 1992). Robinson (1995) develops an optimal 
multi-period approach using Monte Carlo integration. Robinson assumes that customers arrive in 
sequential fare order, low to high, in each of the periods with demands across periods assumed to be 
independent. This approach allows for the realization that posted fares are not monotonic as currently 
closed cheaper fares are often available in the future. Both the re-application of single-period 
approaches or multi-period approaches like Robinson’s assume that demands in each fare class are 
independent and that customers do not behave strategically. 
A separate stream of research that does not incorporate diversion has used dynamic 
programming formulations to develop optimal dynamic allocations. Hersh and Ladany (1978) and 
Ladany and Bedi (1977) use dynamic programming in allocating seats on a two-segment ﬂight. Gerchak 
et al. (1985) develop a model equivalent to a two fare airline model, with Lee and Hersh (1993) 
developing extensions for more than two fares. Lee and Hersh break the decision horizon into numerous 
stages such that only one request is received per period, enabling a ﬁnite state space. The work of Lee 
and Hersh, in particular their use of numerous short periods, has formed the basis of considerable 
further research.  
Anderson and Wilson (2003) investigated the eﬀect on revenue when customers behave 
strategically (defer purchase in the hope that a cheaper ticket will become available) but booking limits 
are set assuming that demands in each period for each fare class are independent. In this paper, we 
start to address the problem of how to modify the booking limits to make allowance for such strategic 
behavior. Following Robinson (1995), we assume customers arrive in fare order within a period. We 
allow for diversion as discussed by Pfeifer (1989) and include the realization that demands between 
periods (and fare classes) are potentially dependent as a function of diversion and potential strategic 
behavior. 
Optimal Two-Period Model 
We will analyze the situation where there are two periods and two fare classes. As in Robinson 
(1995), we assume that low fare customers arrive before high fare customers in each period. However, 
we now extend that approach by assuming that a fraction of customers in the ﬁrst period who cannot 
get a low fare will purchase the high fare and a fraction will wait until the second period in the hope that 
a low fare will become available. In the second and ﬁnal period we assume that a fraction of customers 
who cannot get a low fare will buy a higher fare. Optimal results for the single period, two fare class 
problem are relatively recent (Sen and Zhang, 1999) and will provide the foundation for solving the two-
period problem. Assume that in period i,a fraction di (i=1,2) of customers will purchase the more 
expensive ticket if the cheaper one is not available. We allow for consumer strategic behavior by 
assuming that a fraction w will wait until period 2 if a cheap fare is not available in period 1. The capacity 
at the beginning of period 1 will be denoted C and the capacity at the beginning of period 2 denoted c, 
with C-c>0 the seats sold in period 1. There are two fare classes with revenues of r1 and r2, where r1<r2. 
For i, jϵ1, 2, the demand for fare class j in period i will be denoted by Di,j. The corresponding density 
function will be denoted by fi,j(·). 
In the second period the optimal booking limit is a function of the remaining capacity and of the 
ﬁrst period booking limit if that limit was reached. The procedure for ﬁnding the optimal booking limits 
for the second period is outlined in Section 2.1. The distribution of capacity at the beginning of the 
second period is derived in Section 2.2. The procedure for ﬁnding the optimal booking limit in the ﬁrst 
period is provided in Section 2.3. 
Booking Limits and Expected Returns for Period 2 
Suppose the booking limit for period 1 is l1. Then, given this l1, the optimal booking limit in 
period 2 is a function of the capacity at the end of period 1 and whether or not lower fare demand in the 
ﬁrst period exceeded the booking limit. Let l2(c) denote the booking limit in period 2 if the capacity at 
the end of period 1 is c and the booking limit l1 was not reached in period 1. In this case, there are no 
customers who wait until period 2 in the hope of obtaining a cheaper fare as plenty of these fares were 
available in period 1. Let l1(c, l1) denote the optimal booking limit in period 2 if all l1 of the cheap fares 
are sold in period 1 and c seats remain going into period 2. For this case, some of the customers unable 
to obtain a cheaper fare in period 1 will try again in period 2. The precise number of such customers is, 
however, unknown because the number of lower fare customers in period 1 is censored at l1.  
Consider the case where the booking limit for the cheaper fare is l1 in period 1, D1,1 is less than l1 
and there is capacity c going into the second period. Then the optimal booking limit, l2(c), for the 
cheaper fare in period 2 is either 0, c or the value of l2 that satisﬁes the following equation (rearrange 
expression (9) of Sen and Zhang, 1999): 
(1) 
 
Now, suppose that l1 is the booking limit in period 1, that all of these seats are sold and that 
there are c unsold seats going into the second period. In this situation, all that is known about the 
demand for the cheaper seats in period 1 is that it was at least l1. The conditional distribution function 
for the number of customers, Y, who will wait until the second period is  
(2) 
 
Diﬀerentiate the above to see that the density function for Y is given by 
(3) 
 
The demand for cheaper fares in period 2 is D2,1 plus the demand from those customers who 
wait for period 2. Obtaining the optimal booking limit for the second period now becomes a one- period 
problem and can be found from (1) by replacing D2,1 with D2,11Y. Denote this random variable by 
D2,1(l1). Replace P[D2,1<2] in (1) with  
(4) 
 
(5) 
 
Now the optimal booking limit in period 2, l2(c, l1), is a function of both l1 and the number of 
available seats. Use (4) and (5) in (1) to see that l2(c, l1) is either 0, c or the value of l2 that satisﬁes the 
following equation: 
(6) 
 
If the capacity going into the second period is c and the booking limit is not reached in period 1, 
then the expected revenue for the second period can be written as  
(7) 
 
If the capacity is c going into the second period and the booking limit l1 is reached in period 1, 
then the expected return in the second period is given by (7) with D2,1 and l2(c) replaced by D2,1(l1) and 
l2(c, l1), respectively. The above is straightforward to calculate and explicit formulas can be found in Sen 
and Zhang (1999). 
Example 
2.1.1. Example Assume that 40% of customers are willing to wait from period to period for 
cheaper fares, and 10% of customers are willing to buy more expensive fares if cheaper ones are sold 
out. Plane capacity is 50 with demand being normally distributed with μ=15 and σ=3 for each fare class 
in each period, i.e. total demand has μ =60 and σ =6. 
Figure 1 shows optimal period 2 booking limits as a function of remaining capacity and ﬁrst 
period booking limits when ﬁrst period demand met the booking limit. Figure 2 shows the expected 
revenues under the same setting. As expected, revenues and booking limits increase as more capacity is 
available. As l1 increases, fewer customers are expected to wait until the second period. Consequently, 
the pool of potential diverters to the more expensive fare becomes smaller which means the optimal 
booking limit in period 2 increases. 
  
 Figure 3 shows expected revenue and optimal booking limits (OBL) as a function of remaining 
capacity when ﬁrst period demand is less than booking limits (D1,1<l1). Here revenues and booking limits 
are not a function of l1 as no customers need to wait and simply increase with available capacity. 
2.2. Density functions for capacity 
The capacity, C(l1), remaining at the beginning of the second period is given by:  
(8) 
 
Let g1(c, l1) denote the density function for C(l1) conditioned on the assumption that D1,1<l1 and 
C(l1)>0 and let g2(c, l1) denote the density conditioned on D1,1>l1 and C(l1)>0, i.e. 
(9) 
 
and, 
(10) 
 
The denominations in (9) and (10) are given by 
(11) 
 
and 
 
(12) 
 
respectively. 
If D1,1>l1, then there are C-l1 seats available at the higher price and seats will only be available for 
period 2 if D1,2+d1(D1,1-l1), the demand for the more expensive fares in period 1, is less than C-l1. If this 
happens, then C(l1)<c only if C-l1-D1,2-d1(D1,1-l1)<c. Consequently, computing the denominator in (10) 
requires integration over the regions I and II shown in Fig. 4.  
(13) 
 
Differentiate the above with respect to c and use (10) to see that 
(14) 
 
If D1,1<l1, then C(l1)=C-D1,1-min(C-D1,1, D1,2) and seats will be available in period 2 only if C-D1,1-
D1,2>0. In this case, the number of seats will be less than c if C-D1,1-D1,2<c. The shape of the region 
represented by the previous two inequalities and D1,1<l1 depends on the value of c. From Figs 5 and 6, 
there are two cases to be considered in ﬁnding the value of g(c, l1) depending on the value of c. 
Case 1: c<C-l1. From (8) and Fig. 5 
(15) 
 
Diﬀerentiate with respect to c and use (9) to see that 
(16) 
 
 
 
Case 2: c>C-l1. From (9) and Fig. 6 
(17) 
 
Diﬀerentiate the above and use (9) to see that  
(18) 
 
The Two-Period Expected Return 
Suppose the booking limit for the ﬁrst period is l1 and that optimal booking limits l2(c) and l2(c, 
l1) for the second period are found using the procedure in Section 2.1. We will show how to write the 
expected return for both periods assuming l1 is the ﬁrst period booking limit. Finding the optimal l1 then 
becomes a one-dimensional numerical search. 
The expected revenue for the ﬁrst period can be written as  
(19) 
 
The above is straightforward to calculate and explicit formulas can be found in Sen and Zhang 
(1999). 
If demand for the cheaper fares in the ﬁrst period does not reach the booking limit l1, then no 
customers need wait until period 2 to obtain a cheap fare. Otherwise, a fraction w of those who could 
not get a cheap fare will wait until the second period. The contribution to total expected revenue from 
the former case is given by 
(20) 
 
while that from the latter is provided by 
(21) 
 
For each value of c, all of the expected values in the integrands of (20) and (21) can be explicitly 
calculated in a manner similar to calculating (19). Explicit formulas for g1(c, l1) and g2(c, l1) have been 
provided in Section 2.2. Thus, evaluating (20) and (21) is a straightforward numerical procedure.  
The expected return for the two periods is given by adding (19), (20) and (21). 
Example Continued 
Continuing the example of Section 2.1.1, using the same parameters, Figs 7 and 8 display the 
total expected revenue as a function of the booking limit in period 1 for a series of ranges for the 
fractions that wait and divert. For the case where the fraction diverting in both periods is 0.1, Fig. 7 
displays optimal booking levels and expected revenue as a function of the fraction willing to wait, where 
this fraction varies from 0.4 to 0.1. As the fraction willing to wait decreases, period 1 optimal booking 
limits increase from 5 to 10. 
For the case where the fraction willing to wait is 0.1, Fig. 8 displays optimal booking levels and 
expected revenue as a function of the fraction buying-up. For fractions willing to divert >0.2, the optimal 
booking limit in period 1 is zero. 
If no strategic consumer behavior is assumed, then the sequential application of static single- 
period models, referred to as advanced static allocation (Weatherford and Bodily, 1992), would suggest 
a booking limit of 20. (In applying EMSR to a two-period model, the idea is to combine both periods into 
one, arrive at a booking limit and then revisit at period 2 when the ﬁrst period demand has been 
observed.) Figures 7 and 8 illustrate that optimal booking limits decrease dramatically as a function of 
strategic behavior. The service provider is motivated to become more restrictive in its capacity 
allocation, initially releasing less inventory at lower prices as the level of strategic behavior increases. 
Table 1 summarizes expected revenues if the airline had used EMSR type rules in the presence 
of strategic behavior. As the table indicates, not accounting for strategic behavior results in revenue 
losses in excess of 10% under certain parameter settings. 
  
 
Conclusion 
Finding optimal booking limits for multi-period perishable asset revenue management models 
has proven to be a diﬃcult task. Many of the multi-period models in the literature are heuristic in 
nature. Allowing customers to behave strategically by either diverting to another product or waiting to 
see whether or not a cheaper product will become available adds greatly to the modeling complexity. 
Anderson and Wilson (2003) showed that if customers behave strategically and ﬁrms allocate capacity 
via traditional approaches (independent product classes with non- strategic behavior) revenue losses to 
service providers can exceed 7%. Customer diversion for one- period models has been investigated by a 
number of researchers. The contribution of this work is to demonstrate that ﬁnding optimal booking 
limits for a two-period model where customers may wait can be reduced to solving a number of 
straightforward one-dimensional problems. 
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